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Abstract: This article explores evidentiality (or the linguistic marking of source of information), a topic that has 
received little attention in studies on the history of English. Using witness depositions from the witch trials in Salem, 
MA, in 1692–1693 as material, the article reveals that a number of linguistic features are used to indicate source of 
information, especially verb phrases (e.g. see, hear, tell) and prepositional phrases (e.g. to my knowledge, in my 
sight). It also shows that direct sensory experience and reports are the most common semantic categories of 
evidentiality in the documents, while inference and assumption are relatively uncommon. I argue that the 
depositions use evidential marking in different situations to fulfill a variety of pragmatic functions. For example, the 
witnesses refer to direct experience (seeing) of the affliction by the apparitions of alleged witches to bring greater 
credibility to allegations that could usually not be substantiated. More generally, the article demonstrates how 
concepts such as discourse community, setting, and pragmatic concerns, which have not been systematically 
considered in studies on early English in North America, are crucial factors for our understanding of the use of 
English in the period. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
For speakers of some languages, marking evidentiality, that is, where the information that they 
are reporting on comes from, can be of utmost importance.1 Speakers of Aymara, a language of 
South America, for example, may be “branded as arrogant liars” unless they signal with overt 
linguistic cues whether their statement is based on sensory evidence, on hearsay, or on inference 
(Aikhenvald 2004, 18, 335). This is in stark contrast to English. Although English has the 
resources to mark evidentiality, they are far from obligatory. In fact, most of the time, language 
users only indicate the source of information in a vague manner, leave it to be inferred from the 
context of the statement, or give no clues at all (cf. Palmer 1986, 85). If a language user made a 
statement as in (1a),  
 
(1a) The witch was in the house. 
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the formulation would not reveal how the user came to know that the witch was in the house: 
he/she might have seen the witch, someone else might have told him/her, or perhaps he/she is 
inferring that the witch is in the house on the basis of some unstated evidence. However, by 
lexical or syntactic means, a language user could make the source of her/his information readily 
available to the addressee, as in (1b)–(1e):  
 
(1b) I saw that the witch was in the house. (visual perception)  
(1c) I heard that the witch was in the house. (auditory perception or report)  
(1d) He told me that the witch was in the house. (report) 
(1e) The witch must be in the house. (inference) 
 
Until very recently, researchers have paid little attention to the choices made by users of English 
in terms of whether to mark the source of their information and, if so, how to mark that source. 
This is mainly because scholars who are interested in evidentiality have focused on languages 
that have more or less obligatory systems where the marking is exclusively or primarily 
morphological rather than lexical (see esp. Aikhenvald and Dixon 2003; Aikhenvald 2004; 
Bednarek 2006, 636–37, 652). However, a few studies on Present-Day English are beginning to 
show that users have a variety of means to mark evidentiality and that they employ those means 
for a number of pragmatic and discourse-related purposes (see Pomerantz 1984; Chafe 1986; 
Stygall 1994; Fox 2001; Hyland 2005; Bednarek 2006; Clift 2006; Garretson and Ädel 2008; 
Aijmer 2009; Whitt 2010). The few historical studies that exist, on the other hand, have focused 
on the development and changes of evidential meaning primarily in a limited number of verbs 
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(see e.g. Traugott 1989; Gisborne and Holmes 2007; Whitt 2010). Many aspects of evidentiality 
in English thus remain unexplored, not least the markers of evidentiality (or evidentials) and 
their pragmatic functions in historical periods.  
The aim of this article is to provide a historical study of evidentiality marking by 
investigating the full range of markers that were used at one particular point, in a particular 
historical setting. Using the witness depositions from the witch trials in Salem, MA, in 1692–
1693, I will chart what devices were employed by the witnesses and recorders of their testimony 
to mark the source of information, as regards both construction (e.g. verb, adverb, prepositional 
phrase) and semantic category (Sensory, Inference, Assumption, Quotative). Since the Salem 
depositions frequently present challenges for linguistic studies and since many of the features 
that are discussed in this study have not been dealt with (at least not fully) from an evidentiality 
perspective, I will discuss methodological and classification difficulties in some detail. A 
prominent part of the study is also the exploration of how the witnesses use evidentials in 
different situations to fulfill a variety of pragmatic functions, such as indicating authority, 
certainty, or uncertainty, and signaling distance or emphasis. These functions appear to be very 
closely connected to the socio-historical and legal context of the Salem witch trials. Looking to 
these extralinguistic, contextual factors for explanations, my study is situated within what has 
recently been termed pragmaphilology. This aspect of the burgeoning field of historical 
pragmatics focuses on synchronic-historical usage of language (that is, language use at one point 
in history) and a contextualization of the usage within a particular socio-historical setting (Jacobs 
and Jucker 1995, 11–13; Taavitsainen and Jucker 2010, 12). This study thus not only contributes 
to our knowledge of the nature and frequency of evidentiality marking historically; it also 
demonstrates more generally how concepts such as discourse community, setting, and pragmatic 
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concerns, which have not been systematically considered in studies on early English in North 
America, are crucial factors for our understanding of the use of English in the period.2 
      
Evidentiality: Definition and Classification Scheme 
Virtually ever since evidentiality became a topic of intense study among linguists in the early 
1980s, the concept has been variously defined and the definition hotly contested. The definitions 
fall into two major categories, one narrow and one broad, as Bednarek (2006, 636–37) points out 
(see also Willett 1988; de Haan 1999; for a slightly different characterization, see Dendale and 
Tasmowski 2001, 341–42). Studies taking a narrow approach limit their field to expressions that 
indicate the source of information (e.g. sensory evidence, inference, and reported information). 
This approach is particularly common among language typology scholars, who, as remarked 
above, primarily see evidentiality as a morphological category, where the nature of the source is 
signaled through the use of specific inflections (see e.g. the contributions in Aikhenvald and 
Dixon 2003). Aikhenvald (2004, 10) even argues that English does not possess the category of 
evidentiality at all, since language users have to resort to lexical strategies to mark evidentiality. 
Countering Aikhenvald’s (2004) claim that evidentiality resides in morphology alone, Whitt 
(2010) is one of the very few studies of evidentiality in English to adopt a clearly “narrow” 
approach, although some studies on quotatives or reported speech in particular may at least start 
out from this perspective (Fox 2001; Hyland 2005; Garretson and Ädel 2008; cf. also Fennell 
2011).  
The broader definition of evidentiality, on the other hand, covers both source of 
information and the evaluation of the reliability and probability of the information. In other 
words, evidentiality is regarded as the same as, part of, or intersecting with what is often referred 
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to as epistemic modality (see esp. Willett 1988, 52–56; de Haan 1999, 85–87; see also Palmer 
1986, 51–54, 69–70). This merger or overlap is frequently found in studies or discussions of 
English, such as, among others, Chafe (1986), Biber and Finegan (1988; 1989), Stygall (1994), 
Palander-Collin (1999), Taavitsainen (2001), and Precht (2003). In fact, in studies adopting this 
approach, source of information usually takes a back seat to or is excluded completely in favor of 
epistemic meanings or features (esp. modal auxiliaries). Frequently, then, evidentiality is used 
simply as an alternative term for epistemic modality. Even though some typology scholars also 
suggest that evidentials may have epistemic meanings or extensions, they emphasize the primacy 
of the source marking, showing that evidentials do not always have epistemic meanings, or that, 
in some languages, evidentials never have epistemic extensions (see e.g. Aikhenvald 2004, 6–7). 
The starting point of this study is the narrower approach since the main goal is to 
investigate what linguistic resources are used to mark the source of information and what type of 
source is indicated. At the same time, I will consider the possible epistemic meanings that an 
evidential may have in a particular context. Indeed, it will become clear that the reason for 
marking the source often appears to be pragmatically conditioned, that is, evidentials may for 
example be used to emphasize or downplay the reliability of the evidence given in certain 
contexts. The overlap between evidentiality and epistemic modality is thus clear in terms of the 
Salem material considered here. However, it should be underscored that this is not a study of the 
full range or system of epistemic marking, which would require considering a number of features 
and constructions that do not mark source, including most of the modal auxiliaries (e.g. may, 
might), adverbs such as certainly, and adjectives such as sure. These clearly require a separate 
study, which together with this study of evidentials and their possible epistemic functions could 
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help piece together a larger picture of speaker stance or speaker evaluation in the Salem 
depositions (cf. Biber 2004). 
In addition to the problems of definition, there is not complete consensus about the 
categories of evidentiality, although the schemes that have been suggested clearly overlap (e.g. 
Chafe 1986, 263–69; Willett 1988, 56–57; Aikhenvald 2004, 63–64; Bednarek 2006, 644). I will 
adopt a modified version of Aikhenvald’s semantically-based taxonomy that is shown below and 
illustrated with examples from the Salem material. I will return to the identification of 
evidentials in the next section. 
 
I) Sensory:  information based on the five senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. 
 
I saw this willard suckle the Apparition of two black piggs on his breasts (RSWH, no. 
179) 
 
II) Inference: information based on an inference from visual or tangible evidence or result. 
 
my son Daniel comeinge and vnderstanding I was go<i>nge with him to Boston. and. 
seemed to be much troubled that I would go with the sayd Willard (RSWH, no. 270) 
 
III) Assumption: information based on cognitive processes such as logical reasoning, 
assumption, etc. 
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I beleeue many Innocent persons haue been accused, & Imprisoned, ye Conceit of Spectre 
Evidence as an infallible mark did too far prevaile with us (RSWH, no. 745) 
 
IV) Quotative: information based on a report with or without a specific source. 
 
the Rumer went that the sd martin had a brokn head at yt time but the deponent cannot 
speake to that vpon his owne knowlig (RSWH, no. 139; without specific source) 
 
[…] their young daughter who was viseted with strang fitts & in her fitts (as her father & 
mother affirmed) did mention goodwife How the wife of James How Junior of Ipswich 
(RSWH, no. 284; with specific source) 
 
Since Aikhenvald developed her taxonomy on the basis of present-day languages in which 
evidentiality is primarily encoded morphologically, some categories required modification to be 
more suitable for my English historical material. I merged Aikhenvald’s categories of Visual and 
Non-visual Sensory into one category since English does not make the kind of significant 
distinctions that prompted Aikhenvald to make the initial separation. As I will demonstrate later, 
however, separation of evidential markers according to the five senses does yield some striking 
results. Aikhenvald (2004, 63) does not provide an exhaustive list of aspects covered by the 
category of Assumption, but says that it “may include logical reasoning, assumption, or simply 
general knowledge.” I have incorporated markers of a number of cognitive processes that clearly 
point to the deponent’s mental faculties as the source of information, including belief, 
remembrance, understanding, and opinion. Finally, Aikhenvald (2004, 64) has two categories for 
information based on reports: “Hearsay” for reports without a source, and “Quotative” for reports 
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with a source. Although the two do exhibit differing patterns in the Salem material (as we shall 
see), I prefer the term Quotative for both categories (with subdivision into with specific source 
and without specific source). This is to avoid confusion since the concept of “hearsay” in a legal 
sense, which may in fact cover both of Aikhenvald’s categories, will be of importance in this 
study. 
  
Material and Data Collection 
My material consists of 389 witness depositions from the Salem witch trials, taken from the 
recent edition of the Salem documents, RSWH.3 The depositions represent one or more 
deponents’ retelling of their past experiences (what they did, saw, heard, etc.) pertaining to the 
case of an alleged witch.4 The origin and transmission of these depositions must be carefully 
considered in linguistic studies since these aspects of the documents may influence the linguistic 
features in the texts. In accordance with a Massachusetts Bay Colony law from 1650 (Shurtleff 
1854, 211), depositions were usually not taken down in court. Instead, they were recorded in the 
home of the deponent, of a relative, or elsewhere. They were then filed with the clerk of the 
court, and if the deposition was admitted into evidence, the deponent would be called to swear to 
the testimony in court after it had been read out (for further discussion, see Grund 2007a, 4–5, 
12–14; Grund et al. 2009; Grund forthcoming). What is significant about this procedure for the 
purposes of this study is that the deposition could be written down by a number of different 
people: by the deponent himself or even possibly herself, or by a neighbor, relative, or hired 
writer; there was no requirement that the recorder be a clerk of the court. To what extent a 
recorder (if other than the deponent him- or herself) influenced the language recorded is 
unknown, but there are indications that the impact could be substantial (see e.g. Grund 2007b; 
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Grund forthcoming; Grund and Walker 2011, 47–56).5 The usage of the evidentials should thus 
not necessarily be taken to be that of the deponent; rather, it is more useful to see it as a feature 
of the text, in many cases co-produced by the deponent and the recorder. The usage can thus be 
seen as the positioning of the evidence in terms of giving the source for the information, and not 
necessarily the positioning of the deponent, although the two are of course closely related (cf. the 
discussion of credibly in Fennell 2011, 28). 
 The evidentials were collected from the material through what Bednarek (2006, 638–39) 
has termed a “text-driven approach.” Since I was interested in seeing how the category of 
evidentiality was realized linguistically in the documents, I did not run automatic searches for a 
number of predetermined lexical or morphological forms or syntactic structures. Instead, the 
collection was done manually, and I included all forms and constructions that appeared to signal 
source of information. The approach was thus function-based rather than form-based.6  
As evidential markers are not morphological but lexical or syntactic in English, the 
identification is not always straightforward. A particular problem is that evidentiality may be just 
one of many functions/meanings of a lexical item or construction (see e.g. Whitt 2010, 23–27). 
My identification is thus primarily based on semantics and context of the statement in the text. I 
was guided by the question “What source is provided for the statement/proposition/claim?” or 
“How does the deponent know what he/she claims to know?”    
 Even with this fairly straightforward approach, some uses required special treatment. 
Following Whitt (2010, 79), I do not include statements where the evidential markers are 
negated, such as in (2).  
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(2) I neuar herd hur refil [= revile] eny parson that heth akusid hur with wichcraft (RSWH, no. 
317).  
 
Technically, in this and similar examples, it is the lack of source rather than the existence of a 
source that is indicated. Interestingly, signaling the absence of a source is particularly common in 
depositions that provide support for an alleged witch, where the deponent seems to attempt to 
refute a particular (explicit or implicit) accusation against the person in question. The 
implications of this strategy would be worth a special study, which is not within the scope of this 
article. 
Furthermore, I did not include examples such as appeared in (3).  
 
(3) There apeared a little blackheard [= black-haired] man to me in blackish aparill (RSWH, no. 
122).  
 
Although appear indirectly indicates visual experience, it does not point to a conscious strategy 
of providing a source for a statement. It also signals the action of appearance, rather than simple 
perception. This treatment agrees with that of Gisborne and Holmes (2007, 15–16), who do not 
consider this kind of usage evidential. (See also the discussion of Sensory evidentials.) 
The final and most problematic area of identification and classification involves 
discourse layers and Quotative markers. One of the defining features of depositions is that they 
can incorporate several discourse layers. While most depositions primarily consist of the 
deponent’s narrative, sometimes the deponent reports on discussions that he or she has 
overheard, been told about, or participated in. A typical example is given in (4).  
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(4) The deposition of James Kettle aged twenty seven: years or there about testyfieth & saith that 
I was att Docter Grigs his hous on the tenth of this instant may & there saw Elizebeth Hubbard in 
severall Fitts: and after her ffits ware over she told me that she saw my too Childdren Laying 
before her & that thay cryd for vengance & that Sarah Bishop bid her Look on them & said that 
she kiled them (RSWH, no. 190) 
 
Of particular significance here is that there are several levels of evidentials. The top level, which 
is common to all depositions, is the indication that all the information comes from what the 
deponent says: “testyfieth & saith,” a Quotative phrase. Within that report, there are evidentials 
that were purportedly used by James Kettle to mark his source of information (such as “there 
saw…”), and those ascribed to Elizabeth Hubbard in her retelling of her experiences (such as 
“she saw…” and “said that…” referring to what Sarah Bishop is supposed to have told 
Hubbard). In this study, I will concentrate on the evidentials purportedly used by the deponent 
and exclude the embedded uses as well as the initial reporting phrase. The initial phrase is simply 
part of the formulaic framing of the deposition, and does not give much insight into the forms 
and functions of evidentials. The embedded evidentials, on the other hand, are difficult to 
analyze in terms of possible pragmatic functions, since the full textual context of the reported 
usage is rarely provided and the statements are frequently paraphrased or truncated. The 
interpretation of Quotatives also involves a broader conceptualization of what information 
actually is, especially within the trial context. I will return to this issue in the Quotative section.     
Finally, it should be underscored that this is not a full variational study. While I collected 
all realizations of evidentiality, I did not code contexts where evidentiality marking did not occur 
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but could potentially do so. In order to determine whether a statement could potentially have 
been marked, I would have been forced to make grammatical and pragmatic judgments about 
seventeenth-century English that would inevitably be anachronistic and subjective. This study 
thus concentrates on the nature of the existing marking and the context and possible motivations 
for that marking. I will, however, make some limited, qualitative comparisons with contexts 
where no marking occurs.  
 
Evidentials in the Depositions from the Salem Witch Trials 
The Salem depositions reveal a number of different evidentials, which are used to mark all four 
semantic categories outlined previously (Sensory, Inference, Assumption, and Quotative). The 
overall frequency (shown in Table 1) indicates that evidentials were an integral part of the 
depositions. Only about 15 depositions contain no evidentials at all, while 389 depositions do. 
Although admittedly a blunt instrument, this gives a frequency of about four evidentials per 
deposition. 
 
Table 1. Constructions and semantic categories of evidentials 
Construction Sensory Inference Assumption Quotative TOTAL 
Verb phrase 493 (95%) 45 (88%) 194 (86%) 725 (97%) 1457 (94%) 
Prepositional 
phrase 
13 (3%) -- 24 (11%) 6 (1%) 43 (3%) 
Verb phrase + 
noun 
phrase/Noun 
9 (2%) -- 3 (1%) 15 (2%) 27 (2%) 
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phrase + verb 
phrase 
Noun phrase 2 (<1%) 2 (4%) 3 (1%) 2 (<1%) 9 (1%) 
Adverb -- 3 (6%) -- -- 3 (<1%) 
Adjective -- -- 2 (1%) -- 2 (<1%) 
Other -- 1 (2%) -- -- 1 (<1%) 
TOTAL 517 (100%) 51 (100%) 226 (100%) 748 (100%) 1542 (100%) 
 
In terms of semantic categories, Sensory and Quotative markers (517 and 748 instances 
respectively, or 34% and 49% of 1542 instances) clearly predominate among the semantic 
categories; Inference is infrequent (51 instances or 3%); and the related Assumption category is 
firmly in the middle (226 instances or 15%). As we shall see in the discussion of the individual 
categories, many evidentials are restricted to certain textual contexts where they appear to have 
clear epistemic extensions, in addition to marking source. Overall, the patterns indicate that the 
usage is very much dependent on the nature and context of the trial process in Salem. Arguably, 
it must have been crucial for the deponents to provide a source for their information in order to 
anticipate doubt about how the deponent could know what is being reported.  
Clear patterns emerge in terms of the linguistic realization of evidentiality in the Salem 
documents. Table 1 shows that evidentiality is predominantly expressed through verb phrases. 
Overall, verb phrases make up 94% of the evidentials, with a split in frequency between Sensory 
and Quotative evidentials (both 95% and 97% respectively), on the one hand, and Inference and 
Assumption evidentials, on the other (88% and 86% respectively). However, within this general 
Peter J. Grund. 2012. “The Nature of Knowledge: Evidence and Evidentiality in the Witness Depositions from the 
Salem Witch Trials.” American Speech 87(1): 7–38. (accepted manuscript version, post-peer review) 
14 
 
category, there are also a number of constructions, and the different verb phrases take a number 
of different complementation patterns, as may be seen in (5)–(8).  
 
(5) I beleue in my heart that martha cory is a dreadfull wicth (RSWH, no. 19; Assumption) 
 
(6) She semid to be a woman throu in that gret work of conuiktion and conuartion which I pray 
god mak us all (RSWH, no. 317; Inference) 
 
(7) thus our daughter continuing {about} two or three years constantli afirming to the <?> last 
that this goode how that is now seised was the cause of of her sorows (RSWH, no. 256; 
Quotative) 
 
(8) but he emmedetly was gon as she said (RSWH, no. 85; Quotative) 
 
The most common construction involving evidential verb phrases is noun phrase + evidential 
verb phrase (in the present or past tense) + complementation, as in (5) and (6). The subject noun 
phrase is usually the deponent if the evidential is Sensory or Assumption (5), or a second party, 
if the evidential is Quotative or Inference (6). The complementation patterns are very much verb 
specific (see also Whitt 2010; Aijmer 2009), although nominal that-clauses, infinitive clauses, 
and –ing clauses are the most frequent. Example (7) also shows that an alternative construction 
involving participles + complementation also occurs, but this is rare. So-called “comment 
clauses” (see Brinton 2008, esp. 2; Quirk et al. 1985, 1112–17) occur with some frequency, in 
particular involving Quotatives, as in (8). 
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 The Verb phrase + noun phrase (or the reversed Noun phrase + verb phrase) pattern is 
closely related to the Verb phrase category. Occurring very infrequently (2% or 27 out of 1542 
instances of evidentials), this pattern covers closely linked combinations (or composite 
predicates) where the Verb phrase + noun phrase can be said to correspond to a simple verb (see 
e.g. Brinton and Akimoto 1999, 2). In (9), for example, took notice can be said to correspond to 
noticed, which signals a sensory experience. However, some combinations involving the Noun 
phrase + verb phrase pattern are less closely connected, although the combination appears 
important for the evidential meaning to be expressed, as in (10), which indicates a Quotative 
(without a specific source). As can be seen, these combinations can occur with the same 
complementation patterns (that-clause, though in (9) that is left out) and in the same 
constructions (comment clause with as) as the verb phrases discussed earlier. This category 
(especially the composite predicates) thus underscores that verb phrases or verbal expressions are 
the main vehicles for evidential marking in the Salem depositions.  
 
(9) upon the motion of hir finger we took notis they ware afflected (RSWH, no. 111) 
 
(10) I being at Groaton. some short tyme after John Willard. as the report went had beaten his 
wife I went to cal him home (RSWH, no. 485) 
 
Prepositional phrases involving the prepositions according to, by, in, and to and noun 
phrases of various degrees of complexity represent the second most common category of 
evidential construction at 3%. Examples are found in (11)–(13). 
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(11) in my sight ^{she} tooke vp sd Dog vnder hir arme but Comeing vp nere to hir she had a 
Kegg or a halfe feirkin vnder the same arme (RSWH, no. 351)  
 
(12) I saw no maide there but procters wife according to my understanding did stand att the dore 
(RSWH, no. 494) 
 
(13) for to the best of ^{our} understanding ^{it was} near fiue hours a dying (RSWH, no. 362) 
 
Although (11) is Sensory, prepositional phrases particularly express Assumption as in (12)–(13), 
and often seem to suggest limitations in the deponents’ knowledge or indicate “hedging,” as I 
will show later. 
 The other categories (Noun phrase, Adverb, Adjective, and Other) are marginal, all 
scoring at or below 1%, exemplified in (14)–(17).  
 
(14) thare was a report that y the said hows wife hade said y thay we hade givin the mear <?> 
brimston and oyl and y the like (RSWH, no. 322) 
 
(15) vpon wch wth in a short Tyme after my father & mother Ridd their maer to Their neighbours 
house ye same maer wch sd hough would haue Borowed wch semingly was well (RSWH, no. 327) 
 
(16) I was jealous afterwards that it did (RSWH, no. 488)7 
 
(17) shee sate still A whille being as it wear Amazed (RSWH, no. 31)8 
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It is perhaps slightly surprising that adverbs are so uncommon: the three instances of adverbs are 
all represented by seemingly (as in (15)). Adverbs are usually discussed extensively in studies of 
evidentiality in Present-Day English, although it should be noted that those studies usually merge 
epistemic and evidential markers, thus obscuring clearly evidential markers (as they are defined 
in this study). However, part of the reason is probably that, as the OED indicates, many 
evidential adverbs did not appear on the scene until long after the Salem witch trials (e.g. 
allegedly, reportedly) or were very recent additions in the seventeenth century (e.g. reputedly, 
reputatively), although some adverbs with potential evidential meaning, such as evidently, were 
in circulation at the time.  
It is possible that the heavy reliance on verb phrases or verbal expressions is genre-
related, a hypothesis that would have to be tested on more varied material. At the same time, the 
frequency of the prepositional phrases (while marginal compared to verbs) shows that studies of 
evidentiality in English, which so far have focused on (a limited set of) verbs and adverbs, need 
to consider a broader inventory of constructions if we are to gain a full understanding of 
evidentiality in English. 
 
Sensory 
Sensory evidentials signal a direct, first-hand experience of an event through vision, hearing, 
touch, smell, or taste. Not unexpectedly, only vision and hearing appear with some frequency in 
the Salem depositions, while touch is rare, and smell and taste non-existent. Overall, this 
distribution mirrors Whitt’s (2010, 219) findings of the frequency of the set of sensory evidential 
verbs that he considers. The non-existence of evidentials of smell and taste is perhaps not 
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surprising in the legal context of the Salem trials, where what had been seen and heard must have 
been front and center. 
Vision is by far the most frequent category, with 414 or 80% of the 517 instances (cf. 
Table 1). Visual perception is indicated by a number of means, primarily by verb phrases or verb 
phrase + noun phrases, such as behold, espy, observe, perceive, take notice, and, the visual 
evidential par excellence, see.9 Prepositional phrases also occur, such as to our observation and 
in my sight. Within this category, I have also included markers that are less directly visual 
(although perception is certainly implied), but which seem to suggest a more general experience 
of the situation. The verb find, in particular, falls within this category, as illustrated in (18). In 
this example, visual perception is involved, although it is not as straightforwardly signaled as 
with one of the verbs of seeing. 
 
(18) I found my mare standing leaning with her butocks against a tree (RSWH, no. 377) 
  
Visual evidentials present some methodological challenges. Whitt (2010, 26) makes a 
distinction between two uses of see: one that simply indicates perception (“I see the house”) and 
one that indicates source of information (“I see the house burning”). The distinction rests on the 
second sentence having two propositions and hence “contain[ing] [an] additional deictic 
component because it points to the speaker’s evidence and does not solely indicate an act of 
perception” (Whitt 2010, 26). In the context of the Salem trials, this distinction becomes slightly 
problematic. Compare, for instance, examples (19)–(23). 
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(19) I saw the Apperishtion of Sarah good goe and hurt and afflect the bodyes ^{of} Elizabeth 
parish Abigail williams and Ann putnam jur. (RSWH, no. 7) 
 
(20) a little after Mercy Lewes ^{Mary Warren} falling into a fit sd Sheldon affirmed to the 
Grand jury that she saw sd Good upon her (RSWH, no. 338) 
  
(21) I saw the Apperishtion of Elizabeth procktor the wife of John procktor senr and she did 
Immediatly tortor me most greviously (RSWH, no. 50) 
 
(22) I saw the apperishtion of Sarah good which did tortor me most greviously (RSWH, no. 9) 
 
(23) I saw the Apperishtion of Abigail Hoobs the daughter of william Hoobs com and afflect me 
(RSWH, no. 71) 
 
If we follow Whitt’s (2010) classification, (19) is a clear example of evidentiality since it 
involves two (or more) propositions: “I saw” and “the Apperishtion...goe and hurt and afflect.” 
Straightforward examples (such as (19)) usually involve the deponent observing the affliction of 
others. Although (20) does not have two clear propositions, it is clearly related, as it can be read 
as having two underlying propositions rather than simply signaling perception: “she saw” and 
“Good [being] upon her.”  
The problematic cases appear when there is no clear, explicit second proposition over 
which the verb phrase has scope; these cases could be classified as mere perception, if we follow 
Whitt (2010) strictly. These usually occur when the deponent observes the alleged witch and is 
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then afflicted by the witch, as in (21) and (22). Here a statement such as I saw Sarah Good afflict 
me would perhaps seem strange, almost as if it were an out-of-body experience; however, rare 
examples (x4) do show that such constructions are (marginally) possible, as in (23).  
However, classifying examples such as (21) and (22) as evidentials may not necessarily 
be diverging from Whitt (2010), but instead expanding on his discussion. We might argue that 
these examples have an implicit second proposition (not expressed syntactically through a 
second verb phrase). In a sentence such as I saw the house, the existence of the house is 
(typically) taken for granted, while such an assumption is not necessarily true for a sentence such 
as I saw the witch. In this second sentence, the underlying proposition might be taken to be that 
the witch exists, and I saw marks the source of evidence for stating that existence.10 After all, 
what appears to be at stake in examples such as (21) and (22) is establishing the presence of the 
person or apparition as perceived through sight and underscoring the first-hand experience of the 
affliction. The deponent and/or recorder could theoretically have chosen a formulation such as 
The apparition of Sarah Good was there or The apparition of Sarah Good most grievously 
tortured me instead of the formulation in (22). However, possibly in order to anticipate a 
challenge of how the deponent knew it was Sarah Good or an apparition, the deposition makes 
clear that the information (the presence of Sarah Good’s apparition and her subsequent afflicting) 
is indeed based on direct perception. Clarifying the identity of the alleged tormentor was 
undoubtedly a crucial part of the trial process. Consequently, at least in this trial context, all the 
usages in (19)–(23) seem possible to interpret as evidential and have thus been included in my 
study.11  
What is particularly striking about the visual evidentials is the context in which they 
occur. As hinted at above, the vast majority appears when deponents relate their own or others’ 
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afflictions by alleged witches, who, the depositions insist, frequently appear in spectral form, as 
in (24) and (25).  
 
(24) I saw the Apperishtion of Martha Cory greviously afflect mircy lewes (RSWH, no. 19) 
 
(25) their I saw the apparition of the aboue said gooddy: Easteck: a choaking of mersey Lueis 
(RSWH, no. 205) 
 
Spectral evidence experienced by some of the accusers alone was at the heart of the controversy 
that was the Salem trials. The accusers would claim to be attacked by the accused’s apparition 
and fall into spasmodic fits. Although there was no objective way for the magistrates to assess 
this evidence, it was accepted blindly by most of them. Not until after a massive offensive by 
civic leaders and powerful clerics was spectral evidence disallowed. This in turn brought about 
the gradual abandonment of the whole trial process (see Hoffer 1997, 78–79, 129–31; Rosenthal 
2009, 25–26).  
The presence of a visual evidential may serve two overlapping functions in this context. 
Specifically, it may be a way of anticipating a challenge of the source of the deponent’s 
information: how indeed did the deponent know that it was the apparition of Martha Cory or 
Goody Esty (as shown in (24) and (25)) that attacked Mercy Lewis? The answer, plainly 
highlighted by the visual evidential, is that the deponent claims to have witnessed it first-hand, 
through direct visual experience. However, more generally, using a visual evidential may be part 
of a strategy to make spectral evidence more palatable or convincing: it was a way of making the 
immaterial, abstract specters more concrete, something that could be and was (allegedly) seen. 
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The goal of utilizing an unambiguous marker indicating direct experience may have been to 
emphasize the “reality” of the specters and hence remove or assuage doubt. A reference to vision 
would thus have clear epistemic implications, functioning as a marker of certainty and emphasis, 
a marker that would lend credibility to the statement. Supporting these assumptions is the fact 
that, although there is theoretically the option of not using an evidential, as in The apparition of 
Martha Cory grievously afflicted Mercy Lewis instead of the formulation in (24), such non-
evidential statements are very rare in connection with spectral evidence.  
Auditory evidentials are much less common than visual evidentials: 94 out of 517 or 18% 
of the sensory evidentials refer to hearing, primarily with different constructions involving the 
verb hear, or less commonly with prepositional phrases such as in my hearing. These auditory 
evidentials are infrequently (14 instances) used to signal hearing a noise or sound (as in (26)), 
and, more commonly (80 instances), to indicate what a deponent claims to have heard someone 
say (as in (27)).  
 
(26) we heard the back dore open (RSWH, no. 604) 
 
(27) wee Heard Mary warrin seuerall Times say that the Majestrates Might as well Examine 
Keysars Daughter that had Bin Distracted Many Yeares And take Noatice of what shee said: as 
well as any of the Afflicted pɛsons (RSWH, no. 262)  
 
The second example (27) is clearly related to the Quotative category in that the deposition 
indicates that the evidence is based on someone else’s report. However, while Quotatives simply 
signal that something has been said or told, in constructions with hear, there is an obvious 
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additional “hearing” element (see Whitt 2010, 10; for the question of hearsay, see the section on 
Quotatives). Although this may seem to be a redundant move, the use of an auditory evidential 
may have had an emphasis function, and it may tie in with the importance that New Englanders, 
especially Puritans, afforded to listening. Kamensky (1997, 12–15) argues that listening and 
being able to accurately report what one had heard was a virtue among New Englanders, and a 
great deal of reliability was attributed to those rehearsed words. Indeed, according to Kamensky 
(1997, 13), “only when ear-witnesses’ exact words were accurately restated, closely examined, 
and carefully weighed could the true aim of Puritan jurisprudence be accomplished.” The 
pragmatic function of indicating something as heard rather than simply told may thus have been 
to imply the reliability of the evidence: the witness was there and could hear the very words that 
the alleged witch used. Considering this importance, marking something as heard is likely to 
have been taken very seriously. (Whether the witness actually reliably repeated the words 
without bias is of course another issue.) 
 
Inference 
The category of Inference has some relation to the Sensory category in that the deponents’ basis 
for inference frequently seems to be an underlying sensory experience, although its exact nature 
is usually unclear (Chafe 1986, 266; Bednarek 2006, 657, n. 11; Aijmer 2009, 68, 76). Owing to 
the added level of interpretation, the evidence can be seen as indirect, rather than direct, as found 
with Sensory evidentials (for this division, see esp. Willett 1988, 57). In the Salem documents, 
Inference is signaled primarily by verbs, including discern, appear, and look, but the primary 
marker is seem (40 out of the 51 instances of Inference evidentials or 78%). Seem is primarily 
(31 out of 40 examples or 78%) found with infinitival complements (see (28) and (29) below), 
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which has been found to be the most common complementation pattern of seem in studies of 
historical as well as present-day material (Gisborne and Holmes 2007, 11; Aijmer 2009, 74). The 
adverb seemingly occurs three times and the prepositional phrase to his seeming once. Slightly 
surprisingly, inferential must, which is often discussed as a quintessential evidential of this 
category (see e.g. Chafe 1986, 266), does not occur at all. Part of the explanation may lie in the 
relative newness of inferential must, which, according to Traugott (1989, 42) and Molencki 
(2003, 82), did not begin appearing until the seventeenth century. However, inferential must 
needs, which also does not occur in the Salem depositions, had been around since at least the 
fourteenth century (Molencki 2003, 81; see also OED s.v. must v1 8).12      
Inferential evidentials in general and seem in particular are found in two main contexts: 
descriptions of physical events and discussions of people’s or animals’ health condition or state 
of mind. Illustrative examples are found in (28) and (29).  
 
(28) it semed to be sumthing Like a Littell Doge (RSWH, no. 40) 
 
(29) we whos nams are under written: can<e> testiefie if cald to it that goodde nurs haue bene 
trobled with an Infirmity of body for many years which the Juree of wemen seme to be Afraid it 
should be some{thing} Elce (RSWH, no. 294) 
 
In descriptions of physical events (as in (28)), seem usually indicates an observable event or state 
that the deponent is unclear about how to interpret. In examples such as (29), however, it is less 
clear that the inference is based on observation or observation alone. The deponents may of 
course have seen the reaction of the jury of women, who were convened to perform a physical 
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examination of a woman to discover so-called witches’ teats, which would have been seen as a 
sure sign of allegiance with the devil (Hoffer 1997, 103). However, considering that the 
deponents were unlikely to have been present during the examination, it is more likely that the 
ultimate basis for the inference is the report of the jury or what they have heard about the jury’s 
deliberations (exactly how is unknown). According to Aikhenvald (2004, 373–74), discussions 
of other people’s “internal states” (such as the one in (29)) are often marked with inferential 
evidentials in other languages as well.   
 In both cases, the depositions highlight that the source of the information is indirect: they 
indicate a level of interpretation rather than a simple statement of direct observation. A number 
of studies suggest that seem in these kinds of contexts in Present-Day English (especially with 
infinitival complementation) has a function of a hedge, marking doubt or reservation (Aijmer 
2009, 76; see also Gisborne and Holmes 2007, 10–11; Aikhenvald 2004, 165, 373). Similar 
epistemic extensions are undoubtedly at work in the Salem documents as well. The depositions 
do not portray the deponents as taking full responsibility for the information; in other words, the 
deponents do not make categorical assertions, such as It was a little black dog or The jury of 
women is afraid that it should be something else. The deponents and/or recorders may have 
recognized that categorical statements about other people’s mental state would likely have been 
met with some suspicion: how could the deponents possibly know their fellow New Englanders’ 
state of mind? Using an inferential may thus have been natural to avoid challenges.  
However, hedging (especially in descriptions of physical events) may also have worked 
against the credibility of the deponents. O’Barr (1982, ch. 5, esp. 67–75) has famously suggested 
that witnesses in present-day trials who use a relatively large number of features such as hedges 
and hesitation markers may be seen as less credible than witnesses who use fewer indicators of 
Peter J. Grund. 2012. “The Nature of Knowledge: Evidence and Evidentiality in the Witness Depositions from the 
Salem Witch Trials.” American Speech 87(1): 7–38. (accepted manuscript version, post-peer review) 
26 
 
that kind (see also Morrill and Facciola 1992; Holtgraves and Lasky 1999). This claim is based 
on experimentation where informants were asked to rank the convincingness, competence, 
trustworthiness, etc. of witnesses that were using what O’Barr termed a “powerful” or 
“powerless” style. The styles were delineated on the basis of the use or lack of use of intensifiers, 
hedges, hesitation forms, polite forms, and a range of other features. The use of inferential 
evidentials (especially when expressing less than certainty about the nature of an event) may thus 
have contributed to diminished credibility.13 This comparison should of course not be taken as 
more than a mere suggestion, as many caveats apply. O’Barr’s study (1982) dealt with a different 
“genre,” consisting in constructed witness statements recorded and listened to by the evaluators. 
Furthermore, it is not clear whether hedges carried the same negative connotations in a 
seventeenth-century legal context, and we do not know how these hedges interact with other 
linguistic features (with negative and positive connotations).14 Although the impact can never be 
assessed with confidence,15 the relative scarcity of inferential markers may perhaps be an 
indication that people recognized the problems of hedging, even if it was for legitimate reasons 
(cf. Stygall 1994, 142).16 
 
Assumption 
The Assumption category comprises markers that signal the deponents’ mental faculties as the 
source of the information. Included in the category are expressions of understanding, thinking, 
belief, remembrance, judgment, knowledge, etc. The Assumption evidentials are predominantly 
verb phrases (as indicated in Table 1), including apprehend, believe, conceive, judge, know, 
remember, think, and understand. Furthermore, prepositional phrases are particularly common in 
the Assumption category compared to the other categories (see Table 1), with constructions such 
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as in/to his/my/our apprehension, according to/to our (best) judgment/knowledge/understanding, 
and to/in my remembrance.  
The Assumption category is clearly related to Inference in that the evidence is indirect 
compared to the direct experience indicated by Sensory evidentials (see Willett 1988, 57). It is 
thus tempting to see Assumption marking as having clear epistemic extensions of uncertainty 
and doubt, similar to many of the examples of inferential seem. After all, the evidence presented 
is the deponents’ (subjective) assessment of an event or phenomenon, not their direct observation 
of it. However, although some examples appear to mark that the deponents have limited 
knowledge or that they have reservations about the veracity of the statement, others seem to have 
the opposite function: to mark emphasis, certainty, and conviction. The interpretation very much 
depends on the construction used and the context of the usage (cf. Holmes 1990, 187). 
Assumption evidentials must thus be seen as potential hedges as well as potential boosters.  
When the evidential is in the form of a prepositional phrase or in the form of a verb 
phrase within a comment clause (e.g. as I judged, as far as I know), the depositions often appear 
to highlight the deponents’ limited scope of knowledge, allowing for other interpretations or for 
a mistake on the part of the deponents. In (30), for example, the deposition suggests by the 
inclusion of the comment clause that the statement of “three of the fingers” is an estimation and 
hence uncertain;17 it leaves room for the possibility that it may have been more or fewer. 
Similarly, in (31), the statement is not categorical, but limited to the deponent’s understanding of 
the current situation and of the events reported on previously in the deposition (not included in 
the example).  
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(30) he put out his hand among the clothes and took hold of her hand and brought it vp to his 
mouth and bitt three of the fingers (as he Judg) to the breaking of the bones (RSWH, no. 139) 
  
(31) I this Deponant doe testife yt to ye Best of my vnderstanding was ye same mare yt James 
Hough Junio<r> Belonging to Ipswich farmes husband To Elizabeth Hough. would haue haue 
Borowed of ye sd Comings (RSWH, no. 396) 
 
If indeed these formulations are hedges (as they appear to be), they may fall under the same 
category as inferential seem: they may contribute to less credibility of the evidence and the 
deponent (cf. Stygall’s 1994, 138–39, discussion of jurors’ reaction to the expression in my 
opinion). However, the same caveats as discussed in the section of Inference apply.  
 Other instances of Assumption evidentials can more easily be accounted for as boosters 
of the reliability or relevance of the report provided in the depositions. Indeed, the very fact that 
the Assumption evidentials are subjective and evaluative may have made some of them a crucial 
part of the deposition narratives. The verb believe, in particular, which is by far the most 
common Assumption verb (93 out of 194 verb instances or 48%, in 79 different depositions), 
appears to serve such a function.18 Believe is by and large restricted to one particular context: the 
end of depositions, especially those written by Thomas Putnam, a militia sergeant and former 
parish clerk, who was also the father of Ann Putnam Jr., one of the most insistent accusers during 
the Salem proceedings.19 In this context, the deponents express their strong belief that an accused 
person is guilty of witchcraft, as in (32). The belief is frequently underscored by the adverb 
verily (‘truly’) and/or the prepositional phrase in my heart. 
 
Peter J. Grund. 2012. “The Nature of Knowledge: Evidence and Evidentiality in the Witness Depositions from the 
Salem Witch Trials.” American Speech 87(1): 7–38. (accepted manuscript version, post-peer review) 
29 
 
(32) I verily beleue in my heart that George Jacobs is a most dreadfull wizzard and that he hath 
very often afflected and tormented me and mary walcott and Eliz: Hubbrd by his acts of 
wicthcraft (RSWH, no. 134) 
 
Preceding this statement of “belief” is the deponent’s report on both seeing and conversing with 
the alleged witch in spectral form (not cited here). The insistence on meticulously recording the 
deponent’s subjective belief would thus seem unnecessary: a report of her sensory experience of 
allegedly horrific tortures would presumably have been enough to convict an accused person 
several times over. The key to the usage may instead lie in the narrative structure. In Labov and 
Waletzky’s (1967) famous discussion of the structure of oral narratives, one of the central 
components of a narrative is “evaluation.” According to them, narratives must contain an 
evaluative statement by the narrator that makes clear to the listener what the relevance or point of 
the narrative is; in other words, the narrator has to avoid the question “So what?” for the 
narrative to be successful (Labov and Waletzky 1967, 33, 37). The Salem depositions very much 
resemble narratives as described by Labov and Waletzky (1967), and the evaluation component 
is thus highly relevant for the depositions. For the deponents (and the recorders), it would have 
been crucial to avoid the “So what?” question, because doubt about the relevance of the 
deposition could presumably have prevented the deposition from being admitted into evidence 
and considered during the trial. The believe formula (as exemplified earlier) can have left no 
doubt about the deponents’ evaluation and the claim of the relevance of the deposition to the case 
at hand: all of the experiences by the deponents translate into their conviction that the accused is 
indeed a witch. By its very Assumption status, then, the evidential verb believe would add to the 
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case built earlier, where the deponents reported on what was seen and heard. Evaluation, though 
subjective, would be needed for the narrative to be convincing.   
To some (limited) extent, we can gauge the success of the formula by looking at whether 
a deposition that contains the formula was admitted into evidence either at the grand jury 
deliberations or at the trials (cf. fn. 15). Although caveats apply, there would seem to be a 
correlation between the use of the formula and admission into evidence: as many as 74 out of 79 
(or 94%) of the depositions that contain a believe formula were used at either or both hearings, 
while five (or 6%) were not used at one or the other. The corresponding numbers for depositions 
that do not contain the formula (where admission can be determined) are: 57% admitted into 
either deliberations and 43% not admitted into either. This does seem to indicate that, although 
the formula was not necessary for admission into evidence, it may have been a contributing 
factor. 
 
Quotative 
In many ways, the Quotative category is the most complex. As indicated in the discussion on 
methodology, the Salem depositions frequently contain several discourse layers and a mixture of 
the deponents’ narrative and their reports on discussions that they have overheard or participated 
in, cast as direct or indirect speech (see also Grund et al. 2009, 67). These reported discussions 
also come in various guises and what is reported is not always straightforward “information.” 
That is, the report is not only a set of statements/propositions that are attributed to someone 
else’s telling. Instead, we also find dialogues, questions and answers, predictions and 
hypothetical statements; and all are introduced with phrases that could potentially be interpreted 
as Quotative evidentials. The interpretation largely depends on how we interpret the concept of 
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“information” (see below). This presents some methodological challenges in terms of what to 
include or exclude. Table 2 divides up the instances of potential Quotatives into categories based 
on the type of “information” that they introduce; and Examples (33)–(38) below illustrate the 
main types listed in the Table 2. (Since the focus is on “information” type, I give percentages for 
columns rather than rows.) 
 
Table 2 Quotatives and “information” types 
Type Dialogue Non-dialogue TOTAL 
Statement 77 (45%) 321 (55%) 398 (53%) 
Claim 60 (35%) 166 (29%) 226 (30%) 
Question 30 (18%) 11 (2%) 41 (5%) 
Command 4 (2%) 79 (14%) 83 (11%) 
TOTAL 171 (23%) 577 (77%) 748 (≈100%) 
 
 
(33) the man told her [“her” written over “me”] his name was Jacobs the Father of Geo: Jacobs 
& the Grandfather of Margaret Jacobs (RSWH, no. 135; statement, non-dialogue) 
 
(34) thes moring [= morning] also Mis Lawson and hir daughter Ann appeared to me whom I 
knew: and tould me that Mr Burroughs murthered them (RSWH, no. 125; statement, non-
dialogue) 
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(35) asked her whear she liued she told mee shee liued in boston prisson (RSWH, no. 164; 
statement, dialogue) 
 
(36) mr carr Immediattly said boys what did you see and we both said a blue boar (RSWH, no. 
599; question, non-dialogue) 
 
(37) he bid me that I should not Eate aney of his Cheires (RSWH, no. 482; command, non-
dialogue) 
 
(38) the sd mart<a>n […] revile<d> them with many foule words saying we had took a fals 
oathe and ^{sayd} that we shoold never prosper and that we shoold never prosper for our so 
doing (RSWH, no. 142; claim, non-dialogue) 
 
Example (33) is straightforwardly evidential: the deposition ascribes the source of the 
information that the man’s name was Jacobs to the man himself; the information was not 
prompted by a question or given as part of a dialogue between the deponent and the speaker 
(hence, non-dialogue). Even in (34), the usage appears to be evidential: the deposition could 
simply have stated Mr. Burroughs murdered them (although in the context the flow of the text 
would perhaps seem slightly quirky), but to show where this information comes from, the 
deposition highlights Mistress Lawson and her daughter as the source.  
Examples (35)–(38), on the other hand, are less straightforwardly evidential. Example 
(35) represents a question-and-answer or dialogue sequence (cast as indirect speech). Unlike in 
(34), one can hardly claim that there was a choice to simply say She lived in Boston prison since 
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phrasing the statement as an answer is already conditioned by the preceding question. So, the 
motivation for “she told” could be attributed to the discourse structure rather than the wish to 
provide a source. At the same time, if the deponent and/or recorder had chosen to cast the 
deposition or the sequence as a narrative by the deponent, the statement could simply have been 
given as a fact, dropping the question and providing no source. It is possible that the preference 
for dialogue/reported speech over narrative should be seen as a general evidential strategy since 
the dialogue structure delineates clearly what information comes from the mouths of others.  
Examples (36)–(38) are yet more complicated. (36) does not provide “information” per se 
that is backed up with a source indication; said heads a question. In (37), bid introduces a 
reported command or request. In (38), both the statements attributed to Martin are Martin’s 
claims, one a claim that is true according to Martin and the other a prediction of the future. In 
this case (unlike in (34)), the statements could not hypothetically be presented without the 
phrases of saying, because it would change the meaning of the sentence: We had taken a false 
oath and We should never prosper… would indicate that the claims were made by the deponents 
rather than about them. These “Claims” frequently involve modal expressions, implying 
necessity, prediction, futurity, etc. Expressions of saying that introduce claims, questions, and 
commands would thus seem to be only marginally relevant to this evidentiality discussion. 
However, again, it is possible that if the deposition had been framed as a narrative rather than as 
reported speech the same information could have been presented differently. For example, giving 
the statements in (38) as by Martin would thus be part of a larger strategy of evidentiality and 
hence providing a source for the information presented (as suggested above): the point would be 
to highlight that the statement is not the deponent’s but that it is secondary, a statement that the 
accused made and could be held responsible for (if the attribution is believed). This requires a 
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broader conceptualization of information: any textual string in the deposition could be seen as 
information (whether in the form of a statement, question, claim) that could be indicated as 
coming from a source. Especially in a society that afforded a great deal of importance to 
language (see below), marking something as spoken by someone else (even if it is a question or 
command) would allow others to evaluate the language or the implications of the language 
allegedly used by a second party. In this study, I have thus been maximalist and included such 
cases, but future studies may want to refine this classification further. The choice to include 
“Claims,” “Questions,” etc. impacts primarily the overall frequency of the Quotative category, 
but has less of an impact on the qualitative aspect of the category, such as the constructions used: 
the majority of specific markers are found with straightforward, non-dialogue statements as well, 
which are central to this category. 
 As with all the other categories, Quotatives are predominantly realized as verb phrases 
(725 of 748 instances, or 97%; see Table 1), which include a wide range of verbs of saying, such 
as affirm, complain, declare, inform, and testify. However, the two primary Quotatives are say 
and tell with 259 and 256 instances, respectively, together representing 71% of the verb phrase 
instances. In the vast majority of examples, the verb is complemented by a nominal that-clause 
that presents the statement introduced as spoken by someone else. Verb phrases + noun phrases 
(or Noun phrases + verb phrases) are more common in the Quotative category than in any other 
category. Seven of the fifteen instances involve Quotatives with no specific source, such as 
reports say, news came, and rumor went. 
As indicated in the discussion of the classification scheme, there are two types of 
Quotatives: with or without a specific source, exemplified in (39) and (40). In (39), we do not 
learn who had reported Willard’s abuse of his wife, while (40) makes perfectly clear that the 
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source of the report is the alleged apparition of Rebecca Nurse (or at least the statement is 
attributed to it).    
 
(39) I being at Groaton. some short tyme after John Willard. as the report went had beaten his 
wife I went to cal him home (RSWH, no. 485) 
 
(40) and on the 3d of may in the euening the Apperishtion of Rebekah nurs tould me she had a 
hand in the deaths of Benjamin Holton John Harrod Rebekah Sheppard. and seuerall others 
(RSWH, no. 292) 
 
The two Quotative types appear at opposite ends of the frequency scale. Quotatives with a 
specific source account for as many as 730 instances out of 748 (or 98%), while Quotatives 
without a specific source represent 2% (18 of 748 instances). The sparse references to non-
specific sources may signal that deponents (and/or recorders) perceived the potential weakness of 
such sources. There may be some support for this hypothesis even in passages where we do find 
Quotatives with no specific source. Usually the evidence pertains to peripheral information that 
is not crucial for the main story line or that does not form a major part of the allegation. For 
example, (39) represents the first sentence in Thomas Bailey’s testimony, which revolves around 
some noises that Bailey heard when walking with the accused John Willard. The domestic abuse 
that is alluded to in passing does not resurface again: the information thus seems to be 
backgrounded. Perhaps because of its background status, highlighting it as without a specific 
source was less risky or indeed of no concern since the information was only tangential to the 
real case at hand. 
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The epistemic extensions and pragmatic functions that Quotative evidentials with a 
specific source may perform resemble those of the Assumption evidentials in that they span a 
great range and in that they are highly dependent on context. Most prominent among these seems 
to be the shifting of responsibility for the statement from the deponent to someone else, which 
may have several different semantic repercussions. In (41), for example, by attributing the 
statement explicitly to George Burroughs (the accused), the deponent underscores that Burroughs 
himself confessed to making a woman a witch. 
 
(41) also he tould me that he made: Abigaill Hoobs: a wicth (RSWH, no. 124) 
 
Putting the words into the mouth of the accused probably added to the believability of the case, 
especially in a society that put a great deal of weight on accurately rehearsed words, as 
Kamensky (1997, 12–15) suggests (see also the discussion of Sensory auditory evidentials). 
Indeed, Kamensky (1997, 152–54, 160) argues convincingly that language and words were a 
central part of witch trials; men and women were believed to reveal themselves as witches and 
wizards and to be in league with the devil through their use of language that did not fit especially 
Puritan norms (including cursing, lying, threats, etc.). Paying close attention to what people said 
was thus crucial to ferreting out potential witches. This belief in the power of language may go a 
long way to account for the frequency with which words are ascribed to or reported as given by 
alleged witches and apparitions in the Salem depositions. 
By using Quotatives, deponents may also disassociate themselves from the statement and 
suggest that the statement may be uncertain or even false (cf. Biber 2004, 111). This strategy 
may be behind the usage in (42).  
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(42) our dog bit hir by the leg as she said (RSWH, no. 351) 
 
Although Susannah Martin, an alleged witch, claimed that she had been bitten by the dog, the 
deponent, Elizabeth Clark, may imply that Martin’s statement is false, that she simply made it 
up. After all, Clark is not reporting the incident as fact (Our dog bit her by the leg). Similar uses 
of Quotatives are found in a number of other languages (Aikhenvald 2004, 180, 182, 375). 
 From a modern perspective, the frequent references to what other people have told the 
deponents are surprising. In a present-day courtroom (at least in the USA), many of the 
statements that are supported with Quotatives in the Salem depositions would be inadmissible: 
they would be seen as hearsay, since the deponents do not claim to have first-hand knowledge of 
the claims of the statements; they are simply rehearsing the experiences of others (Black’s Law 
Dictionary s.v. hearsay; Stygall 1994, 138). However, the attitude towards hearsay differed in 
the seventeenth century, where the notion was quite complicated and in flux, as shown by 
Langbein (2003). Although objections were sometimes voiced in seventeenth-century trials, it is 
not until the mid-eighteenth century that a clearly negative attitude to hearsay evidence emerges 
in the legal system in England (Langbein 2003, 233–42). The situation in the Massachusetts Bay 
Colony, on the other hand, is unclear, and little seems to have been written on the hearsay rule in 
early colonial times.20 However, there is both direct and indirect support for the claim that 
hearsay was readily accepted in Salem, and that hearsay was thus treated in a similar way as in 
England. Although a number of practical guides and law books were undoubtedly available to 
the Salem magistrates on which to base their proceedings, one of the prime sources is likely to 
have been Michael Dalton’s A Country Justice, first issued in 1618 and re-issued in a number of 
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subsequent editions in the seventeenth century (Hoffer 1998, 7; Rosenthal 2009, 18). The 1690 
edition, the latest edition at the time of the Salem trials, does not appear to include a discussion 
of hearsay per se. However, in the description of different categories of witnesses, it is stated that 
“[i]f one be an Accuser upon his own knowledge, sight or hearing, and he shall utter the same to 
another, that other may be an Accuser” (Dalton 1690, 408). This at least seems to imply that the 
evidence put forward by this second accuser, even if secondary, would be accepted, and hence 
that the Salem magistrates would have had precedent for using such evidence. 
 More directly, the depositions themselves attest to the practice of considering hearsay as 
legitimate evidence. The annotation jurat in curia ‘swears in court’ (or sometimes simply jurat 
or even sworn) normally reveals that a deposition was used at trial, where it would have been 
read aloud and sworn to by the deponent. Not all extant depositions carry this phrase, but many 
that contain what we would now refer to as hearsay evidence do. (43) is an illustrative example. 
After about 20 lines of texts (not quoted here), the deponents reveal that they have no first-hand 
knowledge at all of the events; instead, it is simply a report of what Joanna Hoar told the 
deponents about her experiences, as seen in (43). Notwithstanding the second-hand nature of the 
evidence, the deposition was apparently admitted into evidence during the trial of Dorcas Hoar 
and sworn to in court (indicated by the “Jurat in Curia” at the end). 
 
(43) {no<te>}: this aboue written was decleard to the two aboue said deponants at the hows of 
Thomas Cox by Jone Hoar doughter to dorkes: and farther saith not 
[Hand 2] Jurat in Curia. (RSWH, no. 155)  
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Despite our modern objections to this kind of evidence, it is clear that it was frequently 
used and that the use was probably sanctioned by legal procedure. More generally, the frequency 
and standing of reported evidence may perhaps again be related to the importance afforded to 
speech and hearing in New England (as suggested by Kamensky 1997, 12–15): if listening and 
rehearsing words was a valued skill, it may have been natural to at least consider re-tellings of 
other people’s experiences as valid evidence. The frequency of occurrences shows that a more 
important distinction for the Salem authorities or the community at large may have been the one 
between statements with a specific source and those without a specific source: the number of the 
latter category is very limited and the examples are mostly peripheral, as shown above. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
As this study has shown, the Salem deponents and the recorders of their depositions made use of 
a number of features to mark where the information contained in the depositions came from. The 
fact that verbs predominate perhaps justifies previous studies’ focus on verbs. However, the 
functional approach adopted in this study (that is, not limiting the study to pre-selected features) 
reveals that other constructions also appear to carry evidential meaning, most notably 
prepositional phrases and phrases involving verb phrases in combination with noun phrases. 
Studying the full semantic range of evidentiality also showed the relative frequency of 
different semantic categories. Marking is particularly prominent in terms of evidence based on 
seeing, hearing, or reports from second-hand sources, while Inference and various notions 
collected under the umbrella term of Assumption are less commonly marked. I suggest that this 
should probably be seen as a reflection of the nature of the legal material and the larger context 
of New England and especially Puritan jurisprudence and communal values. Direct sensory 
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experience as well as the purported (usually self-incriminatory) statements of alleged witches 
was at the center of the experiences of the deponents and the evidence that they reported. Viewed 
from the perspective of the legal process and of the community more generally, markers of 
different semantic categories can be said to have different pragmatic or discourse-related 
functions, often restricted to certain contexts. Markers of seeing may have been employed to 
provide support for spectral evidence in particular, while Quotatives could help to highlight that 
the report consisted of the accused’s very words, which would have held a premium among New 
Englanders. Even clearly evaluative markers such as believe seem to have promoted the 
relevance and authority of the deponents’ narratives. My findings thus suggest that marking the 
source of information was a very deliberate strategy in many Salem depositions. In a trial process 
(including pre-hearings and grand jury procedures), it was presumably important to establish the 
basis of the deponents’ claims in order to evaluate the reliability of the information, and source 
marking appears often to be employed in order to emphasize the credibility and reliability of the 
evidence (cf. Pomerantz 1984, 613; Fennell 2011, 28–29). 
 Overall, this study demonstrates that evidentiality, even if it is signaled lexically or 
syntactically instead of morphologically, is a valid category of investigation in English. It also 
makes clear that studying evidentiality can give insights not only into the deployment of various 
linguistic features in the Salem documents, but also the potential power of the words in terms of 
positioning the evidence of the depositions. Clearly, to fully understand the Salem depositions, 
we need to pay attention to the way the deponents’ information is presented, not only to what 
information is provided. In turn, in order to fully understand the language, we need to 
contextualize it within the particular socio-cultural and legal setting that was the Salem witch 
trials (see also Hiltunen 2010).  
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More studies of early North American material that consider other features from this kind 
of perspective are needed to reveal the close connection between context and language that is so 
familiar to us from present-day circumstances. More specific results of this study should also be 
pursued in other studies to see if the findings (such as the heavy reliance on verbs) may be 
specific to Salem or to the genre of deposition. A missing piece of the puzzle is to investigate 
systematically how the contexts where marking occurs relate to contexts where no marking 
appears, which would present special challenges, as I have argued. 
                                               
1 I am grateful to James W. Hartman, Bernard Rosenthal, Erik Smitterberg, Molly M. Zahn, and two anonymous 
reviewers for reading earlier versions of this article, and to David Konig for information on hearsay. Naturally, any 
errors are my own.  
2 Note, however, the growing number of studies of the Salem examination documents (which record the 
interrogation of alleged witches) from a pragmatic perspective (such as Kahlas-Tarkka and Rissanen 2011; 
Chaemsaithong 2009; Doty and Hiltunen 2002). 
3 Multiple depositions sometimes appear in the same document and are hence labeled under the same number in 
RSWH (e.g. nos. 14 and 18). These have been counted as separate depositions in this study. I excluded depositions 
that do not survive in manuscript but only come down to us in, usually much later, editions (e.g. RSWH, nos. 643, 
645, 646, 647). If a deposition survives in more than one copy, I include only one copy (e.g. RSWH, nos. 497 and 
498). I also excluded 15 depositions that did not contain any evidentials. 
4 For a more exhaustive discussion of the Salem deposition or depositions in general, see Grund et al. (2009); Grund 
and Walker (2011). 
5 Self-authored depositions can be very different from depositions recorded by a second person in terms of their 
linguistic features (Grund forthcoming): in the former, it is the deponent’s own language; in the latter, the 
deponent’s language is filtered through the recorder. Since so many recorders remain unknown, it has not been 
within the scope of this study to separate the two categories. 
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6 This is related to the distinction often made in historical pragmatics between “form-to-function mapping” and 
“function-to-form mapping.” However, the distinction is usually not made in pragmaphilology, but only in 
diachronic pragmatics, the other major branch of historical pragmatics (Taavitsainen and Jucker 2010: 13–14). 
7 Jealous here means ‘suspicious’ or ‘apprehensive’ (OED s.v. jealous 4–5). The meaning of the phrase is thus 
something like I suspected that… or I feared that…, marking the person’s mental faculties as the source for the 
statement. 
8 I have interpreted the fixed clause as it were as a marker of the deponent’s interpretation (or inference), since it 
appears to be close in meaning to as it seemed, where sensory evidence is used for an inference about the person’s 
state of mind. As I will show in the discussion on Inference, conclusions about the mental state of a person is a 
prime location for inferential markers. 
9 There are no clear examples of the verb see referring to more abstract, cognitive faculties, although the OED (s.v. 
see) records instances of the latter sense from Middle English onwards. 
10 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
11 Out of 502 verb phrases or verb phrase and noun phrase constructions, 154 instances (or 31%) take noun phrase 
objects, similar to examples (21) and (22). The remaining examples follow the pattern in (19), although instead of an 
infinitive, a verb phrase with a present or past participle may be used, or a finite that-clause may replace the non-
finite construction.  
12 Some scholars argue that must is never exclusively evidential, but often or always epistemic (see esp. de Haan 
1999:  99; Traugott 1989: 42). 
13 It is quite possible that such “hedging” (if that is how it was perceived) could have been conscious, in order to 
avoid saying something damning about neighbors or friends. 
14 Some scholars of forensic linguistics have also challenged O’Barr’s (1982) framework, questioning various 
aspects of the methodology and assumptions, and some have obtained results that contradict O’Barr’s findings, 
although supporting evidence is also plentiful (see Morrill and Facciola 1992: 193–197; Thompson 2002).  
15 An indirect way to evaluate the possibility would be to look at whether the deposition that contains a “hedge” was 
admitted into evidence either during trial or during the grand jury deliberations, which would determine if the 
accused would stand trial; if a deposition was used at either it would carry appropriate annotation (see the discussion 
of Quotatives below). The use of the deposition during the proceedings would indicate that the authorities 
Peter J. Grund. 2012. “The Nature of Knowledge: Evidence and Evidentiality in the Witness Depositions from the 
Salem Witch Trials.” American Speech 87(1): 7–38. (accepted manuscript version, post-peer review) 
43 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
considered the deposition important enough to admit into evidence. The result of such a survey shows that the use of 
“hedges” is not clearly correlated with either admission or non-admission into evidence. 18 of the 33 depositions 
that contain seem, to his seeming, or seemingly were admitted at one or both of the trial and grand jury hearings; 15 
depositions were not. Again, the caveats outlined earlier apply.    
16 Some features, such as hesitations (e.g. modern um and eh) and discourse markers (e.g. modern well, I mean), 
which may act as hedges in some contexts, may of course never have been written down although they were used by 
the deponents. They may have been seen as less relevant than the substance of the deposition (cf. Grund 2007b; 
Kytö and Walker 2003, 225).   
17 Less likely, the comment clause should be taken with the statement following “to the breaking of the bones.” 
18 The third most common verb is think (x29 or 15%). 
19 For Putnam’s role during the trials, see Rosenthal (2009: 30–31); Hiltunen and Peikola (2007: 57–60); Grund 
(forthcoming).  
20 I am grateful to Prof. David Konig (Washington University, St. Louis), who is an expert on early American legal 
history, for pointing me to Langbein’s (2003) treatment of hearsay and for his comment on the lack of studies in an 
American context (personal communication August 11, 2011).  
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